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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(d), Utah Rules Of Appellate Procedure, appellant Barber
Brothers, Inc., will be referred to herein as "Barber Brothers", appellee Bronson Foianini
will be referred to herein as "Bronson" and appellee Kelly Foianini will be referred to
herein as "Kelly".
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §78A-3-102(4).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
(Including standards of appellate review and supporting authority.)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT KELLY WAS NOT JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE FRAUD AND BAD FAITH DEFENSE
THAT OCCURRED IN THIS CASE?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: A trial court's findings of fact will not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, "[a]n appellant
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite.
this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear
weight of the evidence." In re Estate ofBartell, 116 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (internal
quotations omitted). If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, the court assumes that all
findings are adequately supported by the evidence. In re Estate of Bees ley, 883 P.2d
1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).

Whether the trial court applied the proper legal standard is a

question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. ("[A]ppellate
1

courts have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is
and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction.")- When a trial court's rulings
are based upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one
would have produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the
error rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Avery,
616 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings
v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912).
Presentation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Memorandum Decision, filed August 9, 2006 (R. 300); Supplemental
Memorandum Decision, filed November 9, 2006 (R. 371); Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law, filed May 29, 2007 (R. 426); and Order, filed July 23, 2008 (R.
471)
ISSUE ON APPEAL:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
WHEN IT FAILED TO AWARD PLAINTIFF A REASONABLE
AMOUNT FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES?
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review:

When a trial court's rulings are based

upon a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law, where a correct one would have
produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have the error
rectified in a proper adjudication under a correct principal of law. Reed v. Aveiy, 616
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); Farris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979) and Cummings v.
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 Pac. 519 (1912).
Presentation of Issue: The above stated issue was preserved for appeal by the
following: Memorandum Decision, filed August 9, 2006 (R. 371); Affidavit of Anthony
2

R. Martineau Re: Costs And Attorney's Fees, filed September 28, 2006 (R. 333);
Supplemental Memorandum Decision, filed November 9, 2006 (R. 371); Supplemental
Affidavit Of Anthony R. Martineau Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, filed January 16, 2007
(R. 399); Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, filed May 29, 2007 (R. 426); and
Order, filed July 23, 2008 (R. 471)
RULES AND STATUTES WHICH ARE OF DETERMINATIVE AND OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE ON THE APPEAL
§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees—Award where action or defense in bad faith— Exceptions
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if
the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under
Subsection (1), but only if the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of
Subsection (1).
Rule 52, Utah R. Civ. P. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and
judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 5 8A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law
which constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for
purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a
master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the
court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally
and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court
shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based
on more than one ground.

3

(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend
the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial
pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without
a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may
thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district
court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion
for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce,
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course Of Proceedings, And Disposition Below
The appeal relates to the trial court's decision in a case where car dealer Barber
Brothers asserted breach of contract and fraud claims against Bronson and Kelly in
connection with a motor vehicle transaction. A bench trial occurred and the trial court
found in favor of Barber Brothers on it claims, but determined that Kelly was jointly and
severally liable for only a portion of the amount the trial court awarded to Barber
Brothers.
STATEMENT OF FACIS
The following facts are set forth in the trial court's findings of fact and reflect the
findings found by the trial court. Unless otherwise stated herein, Barber Brothers agrees
with the following facts:

4

1.

Barber Brothers is a duly licensed motor vehicle dealer under the laws of

the state of Utah having its principal office and place of business in Morgan County,
State of Utah. (R. 427)
2.

Kelly is a resident of the State of Wyoming who transacted business and is

found in the State of Utah and is Bronson's father. (R. 427)
3.

Bronson is a resident of the State of Wyoming who transacted business and

is found in the State of Utah. (R. 427)
4.

The acts, failures to act, refusals to act, and breaches of duty complained of

by Barber Brothers occurred and took place in most substantial part in Morgan County,
State of Utah. (R. 427)
5.

On or about October 23, 2005, Bronson came to the Barber Brothers Ford

dealership in Morgan, Utah, looking to buy a truck. Bronson expressed interest in a 2006
Ford truck and asked the salesperson, Marcie Madigan, what she would give for his 2005
Dodge diesel truck ("Dodge truck"), which he did not have with him. At the time,
Bronson was with his cousin and had arrived in his cousin's vehicle. In response to her
interest in seeing the vehicle, Bronson left the dealership and returned later that day with
his Dodge truck. Ms. Madigan and Dave Rowley, the used car manager, drove the vehicle
off the lot, giving Barber Brothers an opportunity to evaluate the vehicle. Bronson
admitted on that day, the first day he met with Ms. Madigan, that an unnamed Barber
Brothers employee asked him, "Does this [the 2005 Dodge truck] have a chip on it?"
Bronson said, "No." (R. 428)

5

6.

After negotiating the terms of the sale and purchase of the Ford truck,

Bronson chose to leave his truck on the lot of Barber Brothers, though the contract on the
Ford truck would not be signed for another two days while his financing for the vehicle
was being approved. Bronson locked his Dodge truck, took the keys to the truck with
him, and left in his cousin's vehicle. (R. 428)
7.

Two days later, on October 25, 2005, after his financing had been

approved, Bronson returned to Barber Brothers and purchased the 2006 Ford truck. As
part of the purchase transaction under the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, Bronson
traded in his 2005 Dodge truck with an odometer reading of 15,800 miles, ostensibly still
covered by the manufacture's warranty on the engine and drive train. In truth, however,
no further warranty existed on the Dodge truck's engine because Bronson had ruined the
original factory engine and had replaced it with a rebuilt engine, which he did not
disclose to Barber Brothers. Bronson had "chipped" the original engine by installing a
computer chip in the engine's computer system to enhance the engine's performance.
While chipping the engine can increase the engine's performance, it also makes the
engine more susceptible to damage. (R. 428-29)
8.

After signing his contract but while the paperwork was being processed,

Rick Jackson, Barber Brothers' general sales manager, looked at Bronson's Dodge truck
for the first time. Mr. Jackson's job as general sales manager is to value all used vehicles
for the dealership. On October 23, when Barber Brothers valued Bronson's truck, it did
so by calling Mr. Jackson, who was in California to a car auction, to get his valuation of
the truck. Thus, on October 25, 2005, after Mr. Jackson had returned to the dealership, he
6

desired to look firsthand at Bronson's truck. He went out to the lot where the Dodge truck
was parked, and found Bronson and another male in a truck, parked directly behind
Bronson's truck. Mr. Jackson expressed to Bronson an interest in looking at the truck and
asked for the keys. Bronson questioned why that was necessary because "the deal had
been made." Without driving the truck, Mr. Jackson got in the truck and observed gauges
consistent with being chipped. Mr. Jackson got out of the truck and asked Mr. Foianini,
"Does this truck have a chip on it?" Bronson replied, "No." At that point Mr. Jackson
walked to the rear of the truck and observed the enlarged tailpipe on the truck, Seeing
further evidence of possible chipping, Mr. Jackson asked, "Has it ever had a chip on it?"
Bronson again replied, "No. It's just an exhaust tip." An exhaust tip is an aesthetic
addition to a tailpipe, commonly put on trucks to enhance the truck's appearance. At that
point, Mr. Jackson felt comfortable with the valuation of the vehicle he had earlier given
over the telephone in California because, in his words, "It's hard to get stung with a
vehicle under factory warranty." He went into the store and told Mr. Rowley to continue
closing the transaction. Bronson left later with the new Ford truck. (R. 429)
9.

After taking in the Dodge truck on trade, preparatory to a new state safety

inspection. Barber Brothers' employees discovered a knock in the Dodge truck's engine
and an obvious oil leak from the engine. In fact, no oil appeared on the dip stick. Jeff
Mclntyre, the technician for Barber Brothers, testified that with a cold start, the knock in
the engine was obvious; but with a hot start, the knock was not obvious. This explains, in
the Court's mind, why Ms. Madigan and Dave Rowley heard no knock in the engine
when they test drove the vehicle on October 23, 2005. Bronson had just returned from
7

Evanston, Wyoming, with a hot engine. The trial court found Bronson was not credible
when he testified that he did not know the rebuilt engine had a knock and was leaking oil.
Moreover, it was unreasonable that, after being locked up on Barber Brother's car lot for
two days and then, as part of a state vehicle inspection on the premises of Barber
Brothers, that the Dodge truck would spontaneously develop an engine knock and have
no oil on the dip stick. Bronson knew of these problems. (R. 430)
10.

Though Bronson had other explanations of why he arrived initially with his

cousin in his cousin's vehicle instead of driving his own truck and why he chose to leave
his truck locked at Barber Brothers for several days before he actually sold the vehicle,
the trial court believed that he was reluctant to drive his vehicle any more than was
necessary until he unloaded it on an unsuspecting Barber Brothers' dealership. The trial
court found that Bronson sold the vehicle to Barber Brothers knowing full well that the
rebuilt engine was defective and leaking oil. Bronson used his cousin for transportation to
facilitate his scheme to defraud Barber Brothers. (R. 430)
11.

After discovering Bronson's misrepresentations and the true condition of

the Dodge truck's engine, Barber Brothers asked for rescission of the contract or
otherwise gave Bronson a chance to financially respond to its claims, Bronson ignored
repeated efforts from Barber Brothers to amicably resolve this matter, necessitating the
filing of this lawsuit and trial on the issues. (R. 431)
12.

Kelly signed the contract documents as a co-signer for his son, Bronson.

Though Barber Brothers tried to show Kelly's knowledge of the defective track and his
complicity in his son's fraud, the trial court determined the evidence preponderates that
8

he merely signed the financing papers as an accommodation for his son qualifying under
Ford Credit. (R. 431) [Barber Brother's contests this finding, and this finding is the
primary issue on appeal.]
13.

Several days prior to the parties signing the contract of purchase for the

Ford truck, Bronson admitted that an unnamed employee of Barber Brothers asked him if
the Dodge truck had a chip on it. After the contract was signed, but before Barber
Brothers delivered the new truck to him, Mr. Jackson asked him two, specific questions:
First, "Does this truck have a chip on it?" Not persuaded by Mr. Bronson's negative
response, because of the presence of gauges and an enlarged tailpipe, sometimes
consistent with chipping, Mr. Jackson asked a second question: "Has it ever had a chip on
it?" To both questions, Bronson said, "No." (R. 431)
14.

Further, Bronson also warranted in writing, as part of the paper transaction,

that he had not removed any of the manufacturer's pollution control equipment. Under
the "Conditions and Warranties" section of the contract, paragraph 12 a), Bronson
represented as follows: "That unless otherwise disclosed on the reverse side hereof,
pollution control equipment, all safety related equipment, installed by the manufacturer
has [sic] not been removed or rendered inoperable." (R. 431-32)
15.

Both representations concerning chipping and the removal of the pollution

control equipment were false and were known by Bronson to be false. First, Bronson
made a knowing misrepresentation regarding the chipped engine. Bronson made a true
statement that the engine on the Dodge truck had not been chipped, because the rebuilt
engine did not have a chip on it. However, that statement was misleading because he
9

knew that Barber Brothers would assume that the vehicle with an odometer reading of
15,800 miles would still have the original manufacturer's engine in it, complete with the
100,000-mile warranty for the power-train (engine, transmission, drive differentials,
transfer case, and cooling system). Accordingly, Bronson had a duty to qualify his
representation that he had replaced the manufacturer's engine, but the existing rebuilt
engine did not have a chip on it. (R. 432)
16.

When Barber Brothers' employee asked Bronson on October 23, prior to

signing any contract, if the engine had been chipped, he knew that Barber Brothers asked
the question pertaining to the original engine. After all, the truck's odometer showed only
15,800 miles. When he represented that the engine had not been chipped, Bronson knew
that Barber Brothers would understand the answer only in the sense that it was false.
Bronson had a duty to disclose the truth about the rebuilt engine or otherwise to clarify
the ambiguous question. (R. 432)
17.

The trial court found that Bronson actively concealed the Dodge truck's

defective engine by controlling when and how Barber Brother's employees would drive
his Dodge truck, thus minimizing the dealership's ability to discover the defective engine.
(R. 433)
18.

Second, Bronson falsely represented and warranted that none of the Dodge

track's manufacturer's pollution control equipment had been removed. Bronson had, in
fact, removed the vehicle's catalytic converter. His explanation that he had forgotten
because such equipment is not required in Wyoming was not persuasive to the trial court.
(R. 433)
10

19.

In asking whether the engine had been chipped, Bronson knew that Barber

Brothers asked the question to ascertain the true value of the Dodge vehicle, as part of the
trade-in toward the purchase price of the new Ford truck. Bronson knew that if the engine
had not been chipped or not had its catalytic converter removed, he could expect fair
market value for the Dodge truck still under factory warranty. Conversely, he knew that a
truck without the original manufacture's engine warranty, with a rebuilt engine, and
without a catalytic converter would be valued less than fair market value. He did not
disclose the truth, expecting Barber Brothers to act in reliance on his representation. Any
alteration of the vehicle, including chipping, violates the warranty, according to Chrysler
Corporation. (R. 433)
20.

Bronson initially took the vehicle with the chipped damaged engine to a

Chrysler dealership for repair and the problem was diagnosed by Brett Carrigan, a
technician, of Carrigan Motors. Mr. Carrigan informed the Chrysler Corporation so that
it could void the warranty in case the vehicle was taken to any Chrysler dealership in the
country for warranty work. Thus, had Barber Brothers investigated the Dodge truck,
through its Chrysler dealership in another city, it could have discovered that the vehicle
had a voided engine. Further, the Dodge truck had gauges and an enlarged exhaust pipe
that can also be external evidence of a chipped vehicle. (R. 433-34)
21.

Within a few days of taking the vehicle in trade on October 25, 2005,

Barber Brothers discovered the Dodge truck's engine problems and the absence of the
catalytic converter. Barber Brothers made telephone calls and sent letters to Bronson and
Kelly trying to obtain information about the re-built engine and any applicable warranty
11

information, to give the defendants a chance to inspect the vehicle to satisfy themselves
of the vehicle's problems, and to amicably resolve its claims against both Kelly and
Bronson. In January 2006, Barber Brothers told Kelly and Bronson that it had a potential
buyer who would purchase the vehicle for a price that would resolve the claims. Barber
Brothers asked the defendants for permission to sell the vehicle because of the pending
dispute and because Bronson and Kelly still had not inspected the vehicle. Kelly and
Bronson promised to consult with an attorney and respond to Barber Brothers, but never
did. (R. 434)
22.

Barber Brothers acted reasonably and in ignorance of Bronson's

misrepresentations. Bronson9s representations were not obviously false. The presence of
the enlarged tailpipe and gauges can be evidence that a vehicle has been chipped.
However, the presence of gauges, especially on a diesel truck that is often used for
hauling, can also be used to monitor exhaust temperature to prevent overheating.
Likewise, some vehicles have enlarged exhaust pipes for cosmetic styling, sound effect,
and better mileage.

Therefore, while external evidence existed to suggest possible

chipping, Barber Brothers acted reasonably in asking Bronson specific questions to
determine the truth about the vehicle. Barber Brothers was not asking Bronson subjective
questions relating to opinion of value, where the law permits "puffing." Barber Brothers
asked questions relating to existing material facts. Bronson had no legal alternative
except to be forthcoming, and he was not. Moreover, according to Clay Carrigan,
another technician, the only way to actually verify a chipped engine is to pierce the

12

firewall of the engine's computer system and run tests with the exhaust manifold. (R.
434-35)
23.

The trial court found that, under all of the circumstances detailed above,

Barber Brothers in fact relied on Branson's misrepresentations, half-truths, and active
concealment that his Dodge truck was in proper working condition and had never been
chipped and that the truck's engine with its 15,800 miles would still be under warranty.
Barber Brothers also relied on the written warranty that none of the pollution control
equipment, including the catalytic converter, had been removed. (R. 435)
24.

Based on that justifiable reliance, Barber Brothers accepted Branson's

Dodge truck in trade on a new Ford truck and gave him fair market value for a
comparably equipped Dodge truck under factory warranty and with a catalytic converter.
Barber Brothers acted to its financial detriment. In tying to sell the defective truck,
Barber Brothers explored repairing the vehicle for $8,000 out of its own pocket to qualify
the vehicle again for a service contract, as a means of still making money on the
transaction, but Barber Brothers concluded that it would still lose money. Under all of the
circumstances of this case, especially in the face of Branson's stonewalling and
intransigence, Barber Brothers used reasonable efforts to dispose of the vehicle. (R. 435)
25.

After Branson ignored Barber Brothers' offers to settle the claim, including

an offer to rescind the transaction, Barber Brothers decided to sell the Dodge truck as best
it could. In doing so, it had to advertise the vehicle "as is," which caused potential buyers
to back off when they discovered the problems with the vehicle. In the course of trying to
sell the Dodge truck, Barber Brothers received three low bids, $15,000, $14,500, and
13

$13,000 on a vehicle in which it had invested of $31,600 of its own money. Barber
Brothers reported these bids to Bronson, who promised to get back to Barber Brothers but
never did. Barber Brothers eventually sold the vehicle on March 27, 2006, with all of its
defects. (R. 435-35)
26.

Paragraph 6 of the "Conditions and Warranties" under the contract provides

that seller may be awarded a reasonable attorney fee to enforce any of the terms,
conditions, or warranties under the contract. Because Barber Brothers seeks to enforce
Bronson's breach of his warranty that all pollution control equipment was on the vehicle,
when he had, in fact, removed the catalytic converter, Barber Brothers is entitled to
recover attorney fees for the enforcement of this claim. (R. 437-38)
27.

Additionally, the Court found and concluded, as a matter of law, that

Barber Brothers was entitled to attorney fees in bringing its fraud claim against Bronson,
under authority of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. Bronson's defense was asserted in bad
faith and was without merit because he has no legal basis for a defense. His actions were
patently fraudulent. This case involves no instance of Bronson's "out selling" Barber
Brothers or of permissible "puffery" in a commercial transaction, as Bronson asserted.
Rather, with deliberate calculation, Bronson concealed and misrepresented the condition
of a damaged and altered vehicle no longer covered by the manufacturer's warranty on
which he knew Barber Brothers was relying as part and parcel of the transaction. (R. 438)
28.

Through concealment

and misrepresentation, Bronson sold to an

unsuspecting Barber Brothers dealership a year-old track with a defective rebuilt engine
that he knew would appear to be under factory warranty. He also misrepresented under an
14

express written warranty that he had not removed or altered any of the vehicle's pollution
control devices, when, in fact, he had removed the catalytic converter, contrary to federal
regulations. The evidence of Bronson's intent to commit fraud in this case is
overwhelmingly clear and convincing. In fact, the trial court had no reasonable doubt
about his intent. Therefore, he could not have had an honest belief in the propriety of
contesting Barber Brothers' claim and he knows that his actions only hindered and
delayed justice in this case. Under these circumstances, he plainly acted in bad faith by
asserting a defense, thereby adding to the already significant financial burdens his
egregious behavior had caused Barber Brothers. (R. 438-39)
29.

Paragraph 12(a) of the contract warrants that the pollution control

equipment installed by the manufacturer, namely the catalytic converter, had not been
removed from the vehicle. By signing the contract, both Kelly and Bronson made an
express warranty under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313. The evidence established that
Bronson had removed the catalytic converter. The court concludes that both Bronson and
Kelly are liable for breach of an express warranty pertaining to the catalytic converter. In
this case, John Barber, on recall by the defense, testified that a new catalytic converter
would cost $350. The trial court received no evidence of the cost of labor to install the
catalytic converter. Therefore, the trial court limited the judgment for breach of warranty
in favor of Barber Brothers against Kelly and Foianini to the amount of $350. (R. 439)
30.

The trial court entered the following judgment:
1.

The Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant Bronson

Fioanini in the amounts of:
15

(a)

$8,518, which represents the sum of $ 1,682 in lost

profits, $6,506 in boarding costs, and $350 for breach of
warranty;
(b)

$13,890, which represents $11,375 in attorneys fees,

$2,240 in sanctions, and $275 in costs; and
(c)
2.

Post-judgment interest at the legal rate.

The Plaintiff is granted judgment against Defendant Kelly

Foianini, who is jointly and severally liable for $4,475 of the above
judgment against Bronson Foianini. This amount represents $1,610 in
attorney fees, $275 in costs, $2,240 in sanctions, and $350 for breach of
warranty.
(R. 470-71)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred when, despite the uncontested facts in this case, it ruled that
Kelly's conduct in this case did not amount to a fraudulent omission. Kelly had superior
knowledge of material facts which should have been disclosed to Barber Brothers. The
trial court erred when if failed to hold Kelly jointly and severally liable for the damages
awarded in the case.
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ARGUMENT
In the Ruling the court issued following the trial, the trial judge made the
following statement:
Kelly Foianini signed the contract documents as a co-signer for his
son, Bronson. Though Barber Brothers tried to show Kelly Foianini's
knowledge of the defective truck and his complicity in his son's fraud, the
evidence preponderates that he merely signed the financing papers as an
accommodation for his son qualifying under Ford Credit.
(R. 0303-0304)
The trial court, however, did not make a finding or elaborate on what evidence
was relied upon in reaching this conclusion. Barber Brothers asserts the failure of the
trial court to make findings regarding the evidence it relied on in reaching its conclusions
regarding Kelly's fraud was error. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires
that, "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon...." In
fact, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "It is well settled that the trial court should make
findings on all material issues tried by the parties, and a failure to do so is generally
considered a reversible error and requires a remand." Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1983). In fact, it is Barber Brothers position that based upon-the uncontested
facts presented to the trial court, the trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to find
fraud on the part of Kelly. The testimony presented to the trial court (set forth below)
clearly establish that Kelly knew of the condition of the Dodge truck traded to Barber
Brothers, and that Kelly failed to disclose this information to Barber Brothers.
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Marshaling Of Evidence
Where the trial court has not articulated the basis for its determination that Kelly
did not commit fraud, but rather only made the broad statement that he only acted as an
accommodator in this case, Barber Brothers is placed in a difficult position with regard to
contesting the trial court's determination. It is clear under Utah case law, however, that
when an appellant challenges a court's factual findings, the appellant must first marshal
all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the
court below. Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177, 1195 (Utah 2004).

In speaking of the

marshaling requirement, this Court explained that "in order to properly discharge the duty
of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very
findings the appellant resists. Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
In an effort to comply with the marshaling requirement, the following sets forth
the trial testimony which relates to the nature and extent of Kelly's involvement with this
case:
Testimony Of Kelly Foianini
MORGAN, UTAH. JUNE 5, 2006
KELLY FOIANINI, CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAY MARTINEAU:
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Q.

STATE YOUR NAME PLEASE.

A.

KELLY GENE FOIANINI.

Q.
AND YOU'RE THE -- AND YOU'RE BRONSON'S FATHER,
ARE YOU NOT?
A.

YES.

Q

YOU WERE INVOLVED IN HIS TRADE-IN OF THE DODGE
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) FORD, WERE YOU NOT?

A.

YES.

Q.
COULD YOU DESCRIBE FOR THE COURT IN A
CHRONOLOGICAL WAY WHAT YOUR INVOLVEMENT
CONSISTED OF.
A.
WELL, I WAS ASKED - THEY NEEDED MY SIGNATURE
BECAUSE HE DIDN'T HAVE CREDIT ENOUGH TO OBTAIN A TO GET THE LOAN FINANCING OR CREDIT, HE DIDN'T HAVE
ENOUGH CREDIBILITY.
Q.
ON

AND SO YOU AGREED TO ACCOMMODATE HIM BY GOING
THE LINE YOURSELF FINANCIALLY ALSO, RIGHT?

A.

YES.

Q.
AND IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, YOU SIGNED THE
CONTRACT AND OTHER PAPERS THAT BOUND YOU TO JOINTLY
WITH HIM PAY FOR THE PRICE OF THIS NEW TRUCK.
A.

YES.

Q.
WERE YOU AWARE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT HE HAD ON
THE 2005 DODGE?
A.

YES.

Q.
HOW DID THAT -- HOW DID THOSE PROBLEMS COME TO
YOUR ATTENTION?
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A.
JUST THE TRUCK WHEN HE HAD TO HAVE IT TAKEN INTO
CARRIGAN FOR INSPECTION.
Q.
WERE YOU AWARE THAT BEFORE THAT HE HAD ADDED
THE CHIPS?
A.

I KNEW HE HAD A CHIP ON IT, YES.

Q.

WHEN DID YOU LEARN THAT?

A.
JUST THROUGH THEM TALKING AND DRIVING WITH HIM
IN THE VEHICLE.
Q.
WERE YOU AWARE AT OR ABOUT THE TIME THAT HE
CHIPPED IT?
A.

WAS -

Q.
ABOUT THE TIME THAT HE ADDED THE CHIP TO THE
VEHICLE?
A.

HIS -- REPHRASE THAT QUESTION.

Q.
DID YOU BECOME AWARE THAT HE HAD INSTALLED
CHIPS ON THE VEHICLE AT OR ABOUT THE TIME THAT HE
INSTALLED THEM?
A.

YES.

Q.
AND DID YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT TO HIM ABOUT
THAT?
A.

IT'S HIS TRUCK; I DIDN'T CARE WHAT HE DONE.

Q.
YOU DIDN'T CARE. DID YOU CONSIDER THAT TO BE OF
SOME RISK TO THE VEHICLE?
A.

YES.

Q

DID YOU TELL HIM THAT?

A.

YES.
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Q.

AND HE WENT AHEAD AND DID IT ANYWAY?

A.

YES.

Q.
OKAY. NOW, WERE YOU INVOLVED AT ALL IN HIS
DECISION TO - WHAT HE'S GONNA DO ABOUT THE VEHICLE
AFTER THE ENGINE QUIT?
A.

NO.

Q.
DID YOU ADVISE HIM WHERE TO TAKE THE VEHICLE OR
WHAT TO DO WITH IT?
A.

NO.

Q.
DID YOU - DID YOU KNOW -- WERE YOU INVOLVED IN
HIS DECISION AT ALL TO GO AHEAD AND TRADE IT IN AFTER
THE ENGINE WAS PUT IN IT, THE SHORT BLOCK?
A.

NO.

Q
WHAT WAS YOUR FIRST INVOLVEMENT, WHEN BARBER
BROTHERS NEEDED FINANCIAL ACCOMMODATION?
A.
MY FIRST INVOLVEMENT WAS THROUGH THE COSIGNING OF THE CONTRACT.
Q.
OKAY. NOW, WHEN YOU DID THAT, DID YOU HAVE ANY
DISCUSSIONS WITH ANYONE AT BARBER BROTHERS ABOUT
THAT FINANCING?
A.

NO.

Q. YOU NEVER DID -- DID YOU TALK TO ANYONE AT THE
BARBER BROTHERS ABOUT THAT?
A.

NO.

Q.

YOU DIDN'T TALK TO SHAWN ROYBAL ABOUT IT?

A.

NO.

Q.

DID YOU EVER TALK TO JOHN BARBER?
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A.

NO.

Q.

NOBODY.

A.

NOBODY.

Q.
WHAT, THE DOCUMENTS WERE PREPARED AND YOU
SIGNED THEM?
A.
THEY WAS BROUGHT TO MY HOUSE AND THEY NEEDED
MY SIGNATURE.
Q.

BY WHO -- WHO BROUGHT IT TO YOU HOUSE?

A.

BRONSON.

Q.
DID ANYONE -- WAS ANYONE ELSE INVOLVED IN YOUR
OBTAINING THE FINANCING FOR SHAWN - FOR BRONSON?
OTHER THAN BRONSON HIMSELF?
A.

NO.

Q.

NO ONE AT BARBER BROTHERS EVER TALKED TO YOU?

A.

NO, SIR.

Q.
DID YOU THINK IT WAS IMPORTANT TO YOU, THAT YOU
HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITY TO ADVISE BARBER BROTHERS
ABOUT THE FACTS YOU KNEW CONCERNING ANY CHIP CHIPPING OF THE VEHICLE AND THE -- AND THE FAILURE OF
THE INITIAL ENGINE?
A.

NO, SIR.

Q.

YOU FELT NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT?

A.

NO.

Q.
SO YOU NEVER HAD ANY MEETING OR ANY PHONE
CALLS OF ANYONE AT BARBER BROTHERS AT ANY TIME.
A.

NO.
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Q.
DO YOU RECALL THE MEETING THAT YOU AND
BRONSON HAD WITH JOHN BARBER FOLLOWING THE HEARING
IN THIS COURT BACK IN JANUARY?
A.

WE MET WITH HIM.

Q.
AND YOU'VE HEARD BRONSON'S TESTIMONY ABOUT
THAT, HAVE YOU NOT?
A.

YES.

Q.
AND DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING THAT YOU DISAGREE
WITH WITH WHAT HE'S TESTIFIED TO ABOUT THAT?
A.

NO.

Q.
DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING THAT YOU WOULD ADD TO HIS
TESTIMONY ABOUT WHAT WAS SAID IN THAT
CONVERSATION?
A.

NO.

MR. RAY MARTINEAU: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BARTLETT:
Q.

KELLY, WHAT'S YOUR PROFESSION?

A.

RANCHER.

Q.

HOW LONG HAVE YOU PRACTICED THAT TRADE?

A.

THIRTY YEARS.

Q. ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A DEALER OF
MOTOR VEHICLES?
A.

NO.

Q.

HOW MANY CARS HAVE YOU SOLD IN YOUR LIFE?
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A.

LOTS.

Q.

LOTS?

A.

TEN, 15.

Q.
HAVE YOU EVER SOLD MAYBE MORE THAN TWO IN ONE
YEAR?
A.

NO.

Q.
YOU'VE NEVER MADE IT YOUR PROFESSION TO SELL
VEHICLES?
A.

NO.

MR. RAY MARTINEAU: YOUR HONOR, WE MAKE NO CLAIM
THAT HE'S A DEALER.
MR. BARTLETT: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR HIM AT THIS
TIME. I'D JUST LIKE TO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO RECALL HIM.
THE COURT: SURE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TESTIMONY. YOU
MAY STEP DOWN. ALL RIGHT. WE'VE GOT ABOUT TEN MORE
MINUTES. COULD WE PROFITABLY USE THAT OR DO YOU
WANNA BREAK NOW AND COME BACK ABOUT 1:20?
MR. RAY MARTINEAU: WHATEVER SUITS THE COURT.
MORGAN, UTAH. JUNE 13, 2006
(TAPE BEGINS WITH MR. BARTLETT EXAMINING KELLY
FOIANINI, IN PROGRESS.)
KELLY FOIANINI, PREVIOUSLY CALLED AS A WITNESS, WAS
AGAIN EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BARTLETT:
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Q.
..DISCUSS THE DEAL WITH THEM, DID YOU EVER DO
THAT?
A.

NO, I DID NOT.

Q. HAD YOU EVER MET SHAWN ROYBAL PRIOR TO THESE
PROCEEDINGS?
A.

NO.

Q.
DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH SHAWN
ROYBAL ABOUT THE PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLE?
A.

NO.

Q. DID YOU EVER -- EVER HAVE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH
ANYONE FROM BARBER BROTHERS FORD PRIOR TO THE
PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLE?
A.

NO.

Q.
THE DOCUMENT YOU'RE HOLDING IN YOUR HAND
THAT'S BEEN MARKED AS PLAINTIFFS 9 BEARS THE
SIGNATURE OF A KELLY FOIANINI. IS THAT YOUR SIGNATURE?
A.

NO, IT'S NOT MY SIGNATURE.

Q.
COULD YOU EXPLAIN HOW THAT DOCUMENT CAME TO
BE MARKED WITH SOMETHING THAT APPEARS TO BE YOUR
SIGNATURE?
A.
MY WIFE HAS POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SIGN MY NAME.
AND THEY SAID THEY NEEDED MY SIGNATURE TO GET THIS
SPECIAL INTEREST, NEEDED MY FINANCING, THAT I'D HAVE TO
SIGN IT. AND THEY BROUGHT IT TO MY HOUSE AND IT SAT ON
A TABLE AND JANELL SIGNED IT. I NEVER SIGNED IT. SHE
SIGNS A LOT OF MY DOCUMENTS.
Q.
DID YOU EVER MAKE ANY VERBAL REPRESENTATION TO
ANYONE FROM BARBER BROTHERS FORD ABOUT THE
CONDITION OF THE DODGE TRUCK THAT BRONSON TRADED IN
ON THE PURCHASE OF THE FORD?
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A.

NO, I NEVER TALKED TO BARBER BROTHERS.

Q.
JUST WANNA TALK TO YOU A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE
DODGE TRUCK THAT WAS TRADED IN. WE'VE HEARD
TESTIMONY HERE ABOUT REPAIRS THAT HAD BEEN MADE TO
IT, ET CETERA. ARE YOU AWARE OF THOSE REPAIRS?
A.

NO. WELL, I --

Q.

AND I MEAN PRESENTLY --

A.

PRESENT -

Q.

- ARE YOU PRESENTLY AWARE OF THE NATURE -

A.

I AM.

Q.

- OF (UNINTELLIGIBLE)?

A.

I A M - I KNOW NOW WHAT HE'S DONE.

Q.
AFTER THE TIME THAT THOSE REPAIRS WERE MADE, DID
YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RIDE IN THE DODGE TRUCK
THAT WAS TRADED IN?
A.

NO, I NEVER RODE IN THAT TRUCK.

Q.
SO WERE YOU AWARE OF ANY PROBLEMS THAT IT MAY
OR MAY NOT HAVE HAD?
A.

I -- NO.

MR. BARTLETT: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR THE WITNESS,
YOUR HONOR.
THE WITNESS: AM I DONE?
THE COURT: (UNINTELLIGIBLE)
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. RAY MARTINEAU:
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Q.
I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED PREVIOUSLY THAT YOU
NEVER DID COME TO THE FORD DEALERSHIP HERE; IS THAT
CORRECT?
A.
UNTIL AFTER THE TRIAL, UNTIL AFTER WE HAD THE
HEARING, I NEVER -- NEVER WENT OVER THERE.
Q.
DO YOU RECALL HAVING ANSWERED THE DEFENDANT -DO YOU REMEMBER HAVING SIGNED KELLY G. FOIANINI'S
RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY IN THIS
CASE?
A.

DID I WHAT?

Q.
I'LL HAND YOU -- WELL, LET ME HAVE THAT MARKED.
I'LL HAND YOU WHAT'S BEEN MARKED FOR IDENTIFICATION
AS EXHIBIT P-27, AND ASK YOU IF THAT SET OF DOCUMENTS THAT DOCUMENT BEARS YOUR SIGNATURE?
A.

YES.

Q.
I WOULD REFER YOU TO INTERROGATORY NUMBER 16
WHICH READS: IDENTIFY EACH AND EVERY PERSON
ASSOCIATED WITH YOU OR WITH BRONSON FOIANINI WHO
PARTICIPATED IN ANY DEALINGS OR DISCUSSIONS WITH
PLAINTIFF AT ANY TIME REGARDING THE SUBJECT VEHICLE
AND DESCRIBE THE NATURE OR PURPOSE OF EACH SUCH
PERSON'S PARTICIPATION. ANSWER, DEFENDANT BRONSON
FOIANINI DISCUSSED VEHICLE PRIOR TO AND AT THE TIME
PLAINTIFF MADE AN OFFER TO PURCHASE THE VEHICLE IN AN,
QUOTE, AS-IS, END OF QUOTE, STATE. LET'S SEE, DEFENDANT
KELLY FOIANINI PRESENT AT SIGNING OF THE PAPERWORK
FOR THE PURCHASE OF THE NEW VEHICLE.
THAT'S WHAT THIS SAYS, ISN'T IT?
A.
IF THAT'S WHAT THAT --1 NEVER WAS PRESENT AT THE
SIGNING OF ANYTHING.
Q.
SO WHAT'S SAID IN THIS INTERROGATORY ANSWER ISN'T
TRUE THEN?
A.

NO, SIR.
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Q.
YOU HEARD SHAWN ROYBAL'S TESTIMONY THAT YOU
WERE PRESENT WHEN THEY WERE SIGNED. DO YOU
REMEMBER THAT?
A.

I REMEMBER HIM SAYING THAT, YES.

Q.

DOES THAT YOUR -- CHANGE YOUR TESTIMONY?

A.

I-

Q.

WHETHER OR NOT YOU WERE PRESENT?

A.

I WAS NOT PRESENT.

MR. RAY MARTINEAU: OKAY. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. THE
COURT: DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?
MR. BARTLETT: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR.
Testimony of Janell Foianini
MORGAN, UTAH. JUNE 13,2006
JANELL FOIANINI, CALLED AS A WITNESS, BEING FIRST DULY
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BARTLETT:
Q.

CAN YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME FOR THE RECORD.

A.

JANELL FOIANINI.

Q.

AND WHERE DO YOU LIVE?

A.

AT 1246 COUNTY ROAD 238, LYMAN, WYOMING.

Q.
ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH BRONSON AND KELLY
FOIANINI?
A.

YES.
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Q. CAN YOU DESCRIBE YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO THEM FOR
THE COURT.
A.

I'M BRONSON'S M O M AND KELLY'S WIFE.

Q. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH BRONSON'S PURCHASE OF A
FORD TRUCK FROM BARBER BROTHERS FORD?
A.

YES.

Q.
HOW DID YOU FIRST BECOME FAMILIAR WITH THAT
PURCHASE? A. BRONSON NEEDED A CO-SIGNER TO BE ABLE TO
PURCHASE THE TRUCK, AND SO HE - I TOLD HIM WE'D -- THAT
WE'D CO-SIGN. AND SO HE BROUGHT ME THE PAPERS HOME
AND I FILLED THEM OUT WITH KELLY'S INFORMATION AND
SIGNED IT WITH KELLY'S NAME AND SENT IT BACK WITH
BRONSON.
Q.
DID YOU HAVE ANY OTHER INVOLVEMENT IN THE
PURCHASE OF THE VEHICLE?
A.
NO. THE ONLY OTHER THING IS I DID TALK TO A
GENTLEMAN ON THE PHONE THAT CALLED ME AT WORK THAT
NEEDED THE DOWN PAYMENT. AND HE WANTED ME TO PUT IT
ON MY CREDIT CARD THAT DAY, AND I DIDN'T WANNA DO
THAT. AND I OFFERED TO MAIL A CHECK AND THEY SAID, NO,
CAN YOU WIRE THE MONEY FROM YOUR BANK. AND I SAID,
OH, SURE, I'LL CHECK AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. AND OF
COURSE IT WAS AFTER ONE O'CLOCK OR TWO O'CLOCK IN THE
AFTERNOON, AND SO THEY COULDN'T WIRE IT UNTIL THE
NEXT DAY. AND HE WAS KIND OF A LITTLE UPSET WITH ME,
BUT I MEAN THAT'S ALL I COULD DO, AND SO WE DID GET IT
WIRED THE NEXT DAY.
Q.
YOU MENTIONED THAT HE WAS A LITTLE UPSET. IN
YOUR OPINION, WAS THERE SOME SENSE OF URGENCY?
A.
YEAH. BECAUSE HE WANTED IT ON MY CREDIT CARD
THAT DAY. AND THEN HE DIDN'T WANT ME TO MAIL IT
BECAUSE IT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN THERE THE NEXT
DAY. AND HE SAID, NO, CAN YOU WIRE IT. AND I'M LIKE, OKAY,
I'LL CHECK WITH THE BANK, SEE WHAT WE CAN DO, BUT IT
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WAS AFTER THE TIME TO WIRE, SO IT COULDN'T GO OUT UNTIL
THE NEXT DAY.
Q.
DO YOU REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL
WITH WHOM YOU SPOKE?
A.
SHOOT, YOU KNOW WHAT, I DON'T. I - THAT WAS QUITE
A WHILE AGO. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS THE FINANCE
MANAGER, I'M NOT SURE.
Q.
DID YOU HAVE ANY OTHER DEALINGS WITH BARBER
BROTHERS FORD?
A.

NO.

Q.
HAVE YOU HAD ANY OTHER DEALINGS PRIOR TO THIS
DAY?
A.
NO.
MR. BARTLETT: OKAY. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR
HONOR.
THE COURT: THANK YOU.
MR. RAY MARTTNEAU: NO QUESTIONS.
THE COURT: YOU MAY STEP DOWN.
THE WITNESS: OKAY. THANK YOU. DO YOU WANT ME TO GO
OUTSIDE OR SHOULD I SIT HERE?
THE COURT: IF YOU ANTICIPATE GIVING ANY FURTHER
TESTIMONY, YOU NEED TO LEAVE.
THE WITNESS: OH, OKAY.
Testimony of Bronson Foianini
Q.

THE FIRST DAY THAT YOU MET WITH THEM?

A.
YES. THE FIRST DAY THAT I MET WITH THEM, I LEFT IT
THERE THAT NIGHT. I LOCKED IT, TOOK THE KEYS WITH ME
BECAUSE IT'S STILL MY TRUCK. SO THEN WE TALKED TO
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SHAWN TWO DAYS OVER THE PHONE. FINALLY WE GOT THE
FINANCE DONE, SAID WE COULD DO IT. THEN HE WANTED THE
MONEY WIRED THROUGH THE BANK ACCOUNT THAT DAY FOR
DEPOSIT. SO WE GOT MY MOM AND WE GOT IT ALL WIRED
THROUGH. THEN IT WAS - 1 WENT DOWN THAT NIGHT TO SIGN
PAPERWORK. THEN I HAD TO TAKE THE PAPERWORK HOME
TO HAVE MY DAD SIGN IT.
(R. 0482 at Page 70, Line 6)
Testimony of Shawn Roybal
(Barber Brothers Business/Finance Manager)
(Direct examination by Mr. Martineau)
Q.
OKAY. DID IT BECOME NECESSARY IN OBTAINING THAT
FINANCING TO HAVE HIS FATHER KELLY PLACE HIS CREDIT ON
THE LINE FOR -A.

YES.

Q.

DID YOU EVER MEET WITH KELLY?

A.

YES.

Q.

AND WHEN DID YOU MEET WITH HIM?

A.

AT THE TIME WE DID ALL THE LEGAL DOCUMENTS.

Q.

HE WAS PRESENT?

A.

YES.

Q.
DO YOU RECALL HAVING HAD ANY CONVERSATIONS
WITH HIM?
A.
OTHER THAN JUST THE LEGAL DOCUMENT PART OF IT,
THE PAPERWORK, THE TITLING, WHAT NEEDS TO BE
REGISTERED SO WE CAN SEND THE PAPERWORK UP TO HIS
LOCATION TO HAVE THEIR D.M.V. TAKE CARE OF THAT. AND
JUST SOME OF THE OTHER PREPARATORY PAPERWORK THAT
WE DO.
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(R. 0482 at Page 167, Line 17)

(Later Cross Examination by Mr. Bartlett)
Q.
JUST WANNA GO BACK TO THE OTHER THING THAT YOU
SAID ABOUT MR. FOIANINI COMING DOWN TO THE
DEALERSHIP. ARE YOU CERTAIN THAT HE CAME TO THE
DEALERSHIP?
A.

YES.

Q.
AND THEN ONE FINAL THING, YOU MENTIONED THAT
YOUR JOB AT BARBER BROTHERS FORD IS TO PROTECT THE
FINANCIAL WELLBEING OF THE DEALERSHIP; IS THAT
CORRECT?
A.

THAT'S CORRECT.

(R. 0482 at Page 178, Line 19)
ISSUE 1
The Uncontested Facts In This Case Establish That Kelly Was Guilty
Of A Fraudulent Omission
The uncontroverted testimony from Kelly in this matter establishes the following:
1)

Kelly knew the Dodge truck traded in to Barber Brothers had problems;

2)

Kelly knew the Dodge truck traded in to Barber Brothers had been chipped;

3)

Kelly considered the chip to be of some risk to the Dodge truck and told
Bronson so;

4)

Kelly knew the engine in the Dodge truck had been replaced.
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5)

Kelly was a party to and the primary financial support for the contract with
Barber Brothers.

6)

Kelly did not think it was important, or that he had any responsibility
to advise Barber Brothers about the facts he knew concerning the
chip or the failure of the initial engine.

The Utah Supreme Court decision in Elder v. Clawson, 384 P.2d 802 (Utah 1963)
is illustrative. In Elder, the issue was whether a party to a contract had a duty to disclose
certain information about real property that was being sold. The Elder decision states:
'One of the fundamental tenets of the Anglo-American law of fraud is
that fraud may be committed by the suppression of the truth * * * as well as
the suggestion of falsehood * * *. FN1
FN1. Quotation from 23 Am.Jur. 850, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment,
Sec. 86.
'Silence, in order to be an actionable fraud, must relate to a material
matter known to the party and which it is his legal duty to communicate to
the other contracting party, whether the duty arises from a relation of trust,
from confidence, inequality of condition and Imowledge, or other attendant
circumstances * * *. FN2 (Emphasis added.)
FN2. Quotation from 23 Am.Jur. 853, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment,
Sec. 77; Annotation 40 L.Ed. 545; Am.Law Inst. Restatement, Torts, Vol.
3, Sec. 551.
'The principle is basic in the law of fraud as it relates to nondisclosure
that a charge of fraud is maintainable where a party who knows material
facts is under a duty, under the circumstances, to speak and disclose his
information, but remains silent * * *.FN3
FN3. Quotation from 23 Am.Jur. 854, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment,
Sec. 78.
'Although the pertinent inquiry in any case where fraud on the basis of
nondisclosure is asserted is whether, upon any particular occasion, it was
the duty of the person to speak on pain of being guilty of a fraud by reason
of his silence, except in broad terms the law does not attempt to define the
occasions when a duty to speak arises. On the contrary, there has been
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adopted, as a leading principle, the proposition that whether a duty to speak
exists is determinable by reference to all the circumstances of the case and
by comparing the facts not disclosed with the object and end in view by the
contracting parties. The difficulty is not so much in stating the general
principles of law, which are pretty well understood, as in applying the law
to particular groups of facts * * *. FN4
FN4. Quotation from 23 Am.Jur. 856, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment,
Sec. 78.
'Knowledge that the other party to a contemplated transaction is acting
under a mistaken belief as to certain facts is a factor in determining that a
duty of disclosure is owing. There is much authority to the effect that if one
party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or knowledge
which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and
which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or
means of knowledge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a
legal obligation to speak, and his silence constitutes fraud, especially when
the other party relies upon him to communicate to him the true state of facts
to enable him to judge of the expediency of the bargain.FN5
FN5. Quotation from 23 AmJur. 857, Fraud and Deceit, IV Concealment,
Sec. 80.
From a careful study of the record and the findings of the trial court, we
think it clear beyond any question that the defendants Clawson and Van
Tassell fraudulently failed to disclose the material fact in this case that a
quarantine on these premises existed and the economic effect thereof on the
operation of the farm, and that the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the value
of the property transferred to the defendants as the down payment on this
contract.
In this matter, there is no question the trial court determined that the condition of
the truck Bronson traded in to Barber Brothers was material. In fact, the trial court
correctly determined that Bronson committed fraud when he provided misleading
inforaiation about the condition of the Dodge truck. Simply stated, Bronson had superior
knowledge, was a party to the contract and failed to provide accurate information.
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Kelly was in the same position as his son. Kelly had superior knowledge about the
condition of the Dodge truck, was a party to the contract and failed to provide accurate
infonnation. Notwithstanding these same positions, the trial court found Bronson liable
for fraud, but not Kelly. Such a finding of lack of fraud on Kelly's part, based upon the
facts of this case, was error.
Based upon the information presented at trial, there is some question of fact as to
whether Kelly was actually present at Barber Brother's location when the contract
documents were signed. Notably, the trial court did not make a finding on this issue.
Kelly may argue that he could not have disclosed facts within his knowledge since he did
not meet with Barber Brothers. Such an argument is without merit. A party to a contract
should not evade a duty to disclose material information simply by avoiding direct
contact with the other party. The facts known to Kelly were highly material.
The undisputed facts in this case establish that Kelly possessed material
infonnation about contract he was a party to and failed to disclose that infonnation. The
trial court found Bronson's conduct amounted to fraud. Kelly's conduct was the same
and the trial court erred when it failed to determine Kelly's actions amounted to a
fraudulent omission.
ISSUE 2
The Trial Court Should Have Found Kelly Jointly And Severally Liable For Both
Contractual And Fraud/Bad Faith Damages
The trial court found Bronson and Kelly liable for contract damages, but only
found Bronson liable for the damages resulting from fraud and the bad faith defense of
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the case. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear Kelly is liable for fraud as well. In fact,
Kelly participated in the defense of the case with knowledge equal to that of Bronson. It
was based on this bad faith defense that Barber Brothers was required to incur costs and
attorney fees. For these reasons, Kelly should be jointly and severally liable for all of the
damages awarded by the Court.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing facts and legal argument, Barber Brothers requests that
this Court reverse the detennination of the trial court that Kelly was jointly and severally
liable for the fraud in this case, and remand this matter back to the trial court for a proper
determination of costs and attorney fees. Barber Brothers also requests the costs and
attorney fees it has incurred in prosecuting this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ffif day of April, 2008.

RayGr^artineau
Anthdny R. Martineau
Brett D. Cragun
Attorneys For Plaintiff/Appellant
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant
was served upon the following individuals by mailing two copies thereof, postage
prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this 2-^ day of April, 2008.
Matthew A. Bartlett, Esq.
5093 S 1500 W
Riverdale,UT 84405
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ADDENDUM

RAY G. MARTINEAU (#2105)
ANTHONY R. MARTINEAU (#5859)
BRETT D. CRAGUN (#8683)
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone (801) 486-0200
Facsimile (801) 486-0383
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR MORGAN COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BARBER BROTHERS FORD, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

;)
)
]»

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

]

KELLY G. FOIANINI; and BRONSON
FOIANINI,
Defendants.

;
;
)
]I

Civil No. 050500101 DC
Judge Michael D. Lyon

The above-entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Michael D.
Lyon, sitting without a jury, on June 5 and June 13, 2006, the plaintiff Barber Brothers Ford, Inc.
appearing by and through its president and dealer principal John Barber, and its legal counsel
Ray G. Martineau and Anthony R. Martineau, and the defendants Kelly G. Foianini and Bronson
Foianini appearing in person and by and tlirough their legal counsel Matthew A. Bartlett, and the
Court having heard and carefully reviewed and considered all of the evidence offered and

presented by the parties hereto, together with the statements and arguments of counsel, and the
Court having heretofore issued its Memorandum Decision dated August 6, 2006 herein, and the
Court being fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor now makes and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a duly licensed motor vehicle dealer under the laws of the state of Utah

having its principal office and place of business in Morgan County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant Kelly G. Foianini ("K. Foianini") is a resident of the State of Wyoming

who at all material times herein transacted business and is found in the State of Utah.
3.

Defendant Bronson Foianini ("B. Foianini") is a resident of the State of Wyoming

who at all material times herein transacted business and is found in the State of Utah.
4.

The defendants, and each of them, are subject to the jurisdiction of the above-

entitled Court under and pursuant to Utah's Long Arm Statue, UCA §§ 78-27-22, et seq.
5.

The acts, failures to act, refusals to act, and breaches of duty complained of by

plaintiff herein occurred and took place in most substantial part in Morgan County, State of
Utah.
6.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to the above-entitled action

is properly vested in the above-entitled Court pursuant to the provisions of UCA §§ 78-3-4 and
78-27-22, et seq.
7.

Venue of the above-entitled action is properly vested in the above-entitled Court

pursuant to the provisions of UCA §§ 78-13-4 and UCA § 78-13-7.
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8.

On or about October 23, 2005, Bronson Foianini ("Mr. Foianini") came to the

Barber Brothers Ford dealership in Morgan, Utah, looking to buy a truck. Mr. Foianini expressed
interest in a 2006 Ford truck and asked the salesperson, Marcie Madigan, what she would give
for his 2005 Dodge diesel truck, which he did not have with him, At the time, Mr. Foianini was
with his cousin and had arrived in his cousin's vehicle. In response to her interest in seeing the
vehicle, Mr. Foianini left the dealership and returned later that day with his Dodge truck. Ms.
Madigan and Dave Rowley, the used car manager, drove the veliicle off the lot, giving Barber
Brothers an opportunity to evaluate the vehicle. Mr. Foianini admits on that day, the first day he
met with Ms. Madigan, that an unnamed Barber Brothers employee asked him, "Does this [the
2005 Dodge truck] have a chip on it?" Mr. Foianini said, "No."
9.

After negotiating the terms of the sale and purchase of the Ford truck, Mr.

Foianini chose to leave his truck on the lot of Barber Brothers, though the contract on the Ford
truck would not be signed for another two days while his financing for the vehicle was being
approved. He locked his Dodge truck, took the keys to the truck with him, and left in his cousin's
vehicle.
10.

Two days later, on October 25, 2005, after his financing had been approved, Mr.

Foianini returned to Barber Brothers and purchased the 2006 Ford truck. As part of the purchase
transaction under the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale, Mr. Foianini traded in his 2005 Dodge
truck with an odometer reading of 15,800 miles, ostensibly still covered by the manufacture's
warranty on the engine and drive train. In truth, however, no further warranty existed on the
Dodge truck's engine because Mr. Foianini had ruined the original factory engine and had
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replaced it with a rebuilt engine, which he did not disclose to Barber Brothers. Mr. Foianini had
"chipped" the original engine by installing a computer chip in the engine's computer system to
enhance the engine's performance. While chipping the engine can increase the engine's
performance, it also makes the engine more susceptible to damage.
11.

After signing his contract but while the paperwork was being processed, Rick

Jackson, Barber Brothers' general sales manager, looked at Mr. Foianini's Dodge truck for the
first time. Mr. Jackson's job as general sales manager is to value all used vehicles for the
dealership. On October 23, when Barber Brothers valued Mr. Foianini's truck, it did so by
calling Mi*. Jackson, who was in California to a car auction, to get his valuation of the truck.
Thus, on October 25, 2005, after Mr. Jackson had returned to the dealership, he desired to look
firsthand at Mr. Foianini's track. He went out to the lot where the Dodge truck was parked, and
found Mr. Foianini and another male in a truck, parked directly behind Mr. Foianini's truck. Mr.
Jackson expressed to Mr. Foianini an interest in looking at the truck and asked for the keys. Mr.
Foianini questioned why that was necessary because "the deal had been made." Without driving
the truck, Mr. Jackson got in the truck and observed gauges consistent with being chipped. Mr.
Jackson got out of the truck and asked Mr. Foianini, "Does this truck have a chip on it?" Mr.
Foianini replied, "No." At that point Mr. Jackson walked to the rear of the truck and observed the
enlarged tailpipe on the truck, Seeing further evidence of possible chipping, Mr. Jackson asked,
"Has it ever had a chip on it?" Mr. Foianini again replied, "No. It's just an exhaust tip." An
exhaust tip is an aesthetic addition to a tailpipe, commonly put on trucks to enhance the truck's
appearance. At that point, Mr. Jackson felt comfortable with the valuation of the vehicle he had
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earlier given over the telephone in California because, in his words, "It's hard to get stung with a
vehicle under factory warranty." He went into the store and told Mr. Rowley to continue closing
the transaction. Mr. Foianini left later with the new Ford truck.
12.

After laking in the Dodge truck on trade, preparatory to a new state safety

inspection. Barber Brothers' employees discovered a knock in the Dodge track's engine and an
obvious oil leak from the engine. In fact, no oil appeared on the dip stick. Jeff Mclntyre, the
technician for Barber Brothers, testified that with a cold start, the Icnock in the engine was
obvious; but with a hot start, the Icnock was not obvious. This explains, in the Court's mind, why Ms.
Madigan and Dave Rowley heard no knock in the engine when they test drove the vehicle on October 23,
2005. Mr. Foianini had just returned from Evanston, Wyoming, with a hot engine. The Court finds Mr.
Foianini not credible when he testified that he did not know the rebuilt engine had a Icnock and was
leaking oil. Moreover, it is not reasonable that, after being locked up on Barber Brother's car lot for two
days and then, as part of a state vehicle inspection on the premises of Barber Brothers, that the Dodge
truck would spontaneously develop an engine knock and have no oil on the dip stick. Mr. Foianini knew
of these problems,
13.

Though Mr. Foianini had other explanations of why he arrived initially with his

cousin in his cousin's vehicle instead of driving his own truck and why he chose to leave his
truck locked at Barber Brothers for several days before he actually sold the vehicle, the Court
believes that he was reluctant to drive his vehicle any more than was necessary until he unloaded
it on an unsuspecting Barber Brothers' dealership. The Court finds that Mr. Foianini sold the
vehicle to Barber Brothers knowing full well that the rebuilt engine was defective and leaking
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oil. Mr. Foianini used his cousin for transportation to facilitate his scheme to defraud Barber
Brothers.
14.

After discovering Bronson Foianini's misrepresentations and the true condition of

the Dodge truck's engine, Barber Brothers asked for rescission of the contract or otherwise gave
Mr. Foianini a chance to financially respond to its claims, Mr. Foianini ignored repeated efforts
from Barber Brothers to amicably resolve this matter, necessitating the filing of this lawsuit and
trial on the issues.
15.

Kelly Foianini signed the contract documents as a co-signer for his son, Bronson.

Though Barber Brothers tried to show Kelly Foianini's knowledge of the defective truck and his
complicity in his son's fraud, the evidence preponderates that he merely signed the financing
papers as an accommodation for his son qualifying under Ford Credit.
16.

Several days prior to the parties signing the contract of purchase for the Ford

truck, Mr. Foianini admitted that an unnamed employee of Barber Brothers asked him if the
Dodge truck had a chip on it. After the contract was signed, but before Barber Brothers delivered
the new truck to him, Mr. Jackson asked him two, specific questions: First, "Does this truck have
a chip on it?" Not persuaded by Mr. Foianini's negative response, because of the presence of
gauges and an enlarged tailpipe, sometimes consistent with chipping, Mr. Jackson asked a
second question: "Has it ever had a chip on it?" To both questions, Mr. Foianini said, "No."
17.

Further, Mr. Foianini also warranted in writing, as part of the paper transaction,

that he had not removed any of the manufacturer's pollution control equipment. Under the
"Conditions and Warranties" section of the contract, paragraph 12 a), Mr. Foianini represented as
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follows: 'That unless otherwise disclosed on the reverse side hereof, pollution control
equipment, all safety related equipment, installed by the manufacturer has [sic] not been
removed or rendered inoperable.
18.

Both representations concerning chipping and the removal of the pollution control

equipment were false and were known by Mr. Foianini to be false. First, Mr. Foianini made a
knowing misrepresentation regarding the chipped engine. Mr. Foianini made a true statement
that the engine on the Dodge truck had not been chipped, because the rebuilt engine did not have
a chip on it. However, that statement was misleading because he knew that Barber Brothers
would assume that the vehicle with an odometer reading of 15,800 miles would still have the
original manufacturer's engine in it, complete with the 100,000-mile warranty for the powertrain (engine, transmission, drive differentials, transfer case, and cooling system). Accordingly,
Mr. Foianini had a duty to qualify his representation that he had replaced the manufacturer's
engine, but the existing rebuilt engine did not have a chip on it.
19.

When Barber Brothers' employee asked Mr. Foianini on October 23, prior to

signing any contract, if the engine had been chipped, he knew that Barber Brothers asked the
question pertaining to the original engine. After all, the truck's odometer showed only 15,800
miles. When he represented that the engine had not been chipped, Mr. Foianini knew that Barber
Brothers would understand the answer only in the sense that it was false. Mr. Foianini had a duty
to disclose the truth about the rebuilt engine or otherwise to clarify the ambiguous question.
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20.

.The Court finds that Mr. Foianini actively concealed the Dodge truck's defective

engine by controlling when and how Barber Brother's employees would drive his Dodge track,
thus minimizing the dealership's ability to discover the defective engine.
21.

Second, Mr. Foianini falsely represented and warranted that none of the Dodge

track's manufacturer's pollution control equipment had been removed. Mr. Foianini had, in fact,
removed the vehicle's catalytic converter. His explanation that he had forgotten because such
equipment is not required in Wyoming is not persuasive.
22.

In asking whether the engine had been chipped, Mr. Foianini knew that Barber

Brothers asked the question to ascertain the true value of the Dodge vehicle, as part of the tradein toward the purchase price of the new Ford track. Mr. Foianini knew that if the engine had not
been chipped or had its catalytic converter removed, he could expect fair market value for the
Dodge truck still under factory warranty. Conversely, he knew that a truck without the original
manufacture's engine warranty, with a rebuilt engine, and without a catalytic converter would be
valued less than fair market value. He did not disclose the truth, expecting Barber Brothers to act
in reliance on his representation. Any alteration of the vehicle, including chipping, violates the
warranty, according to Chrysler Corporation.
23.

Mr. Foianini initially took the vehicle with the chipped damaged engine to a

Chrysler dealership for repair and the problem was diagnosed by Brett Carrigun, a technician, of
Carrigun Motors. Mr. Carrigun informed the Chrysler Corporation so that it could void the
warranty in case the vehicle was taken to any Chrysler dealership in the Country for warranty
work. Thus, had Barber Brothers investigated the Dodge truck, through its Chrysler dealership
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in another city, it could have discovered that the vehicle had a voided engine. Further, the Dodge
truck had gauges and an enlarged exhaust pipe that can also be external evidence of a chipped
vehicle.
24.

Within a few days of taking the vehicle in trade on October 25, 2005, Barber

Brothers discovered the Dodge's truck's engine problems and the absence of the catalytic
converter. Barber Brothers made telephone calls and sent letters to defendants trying to obtain
information abut the re-built engine and any applicable warranty information, to give the
defendants a chance to inspect the vehicle to satisfy themselves of the vehicles problems, and to
amicably resolve its claims against both Kelly and Bronson Foianini. In January 2006, Barber
Brothers told defendants that plaintiff had a potential buyer who would purchase the vehicle for a
price that would resolve the claims. Barber Brothers asked the defendants for permission to sell
the vehicle because of the pending dispute and because defendants still had not inspected the
vehicle. Defendants promised to consult with an attorney and respond to Barber Brothers, but
never did.
25.

Barber Brothers acted reasonably and in ignorance of Mr. Foianini's

misrepresentations. Mr. Foianini's representations were not obviously false. The presence of the
enlarged tailpipe and gauges can be evidence that a vehicle has been chipped. However, the
presence of gauges, especially on a diesel truck that is often used for hauling, can also be used to
monitor exhaust temperature to prevent overheating. Likewise, some vehicle have enlarged
exhaust pipes for cosmetic styling, sound effect, and better mileage. Therefore, while external
evidence existed to suggest possible chipping, Barber Brothers acted reasonably in asking Mr.
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Foianini specific questions to determine the truth about the vehicle. Barber Brothers was not
asking Mr. Foianini subjective questions relating to opinion of value, where the law permits
"puffing." Barber Brothers asked questions relating to existing material facts. Mr. Foianini had
no legal alternative except to be forthcoming, and he was not. Moreover, according to Clay
Carrigun, another teclinician, the only way to actually verify a chipped engine is to pierce the
firewall of the engine's computer system and run tests with the exhaust manifold.
26.

The Court finds that, under all of the circumstances detailed above, Barber

Brothers in fact relied on Mr. Foianini's misrepresentations, half-truths, and active concealment
that his Dodge truck was in proper working condition and had never been chipped and that the
truck's engine with its 15,800 miles would still be under warranty. Barber Brothers also relied on
the written warranty that none of the pollution control equipment, including the catalytic
converter, had been removed.
27.

Based on that justifiable reliance, Barber Brothers accepted Mr. Foianini's Dodge

truck in trade on a new Ford truck and gave him fair market value for a comparably equipped
Dodge truck under factory warranty and with a catalytic converter. Barber' Brothers acted to its
financial detriment. In tying to sell the defective truck, Barber Brothers explored repairing the
vehicle for $8,000 out of its own pocket to qualify the vehicle again for a service contract, as a
means of still making money on the transaction, but Barber Brothers concluded that it would still
lose money. Under all of the circumstances of this case, especially in the face of Mr. Foianini's
stonewalling and intransigence, Barber Brothers used reasonable efforts to dispose of the vehicle.
28.

After Mr. Foianini ignored Barber Brothers' offers to settle the claim, including
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an offer to rescind the transaction, Barber Brothers decided to sell the Dodge truck as best it
could. In doing so, it had to advertise the vehicle "as is," which caused potential buyers to back
off when they discovered the problems with the vehicle. In the course of frying to sell the Dodge
truck, Barber Brothers received three low bids, $15,000, $14,500, and $13,000 on a vehicle in
which it had invested of $31 ,600 of its own money. Barber Brothers reported these bids to Mr.
Foianmi, who promised to get back to Barber Brothers but never did. Barber Brothers eventually
sold the vehicle on March 27, 2006, with all of its defects.
29.

John Barber, the owner of the dealership, testified that, based on an average gross

profit on all used car sales in his dealership for a year, he lost an estimated profit of $2,500 to
$3,000 on the Dodge truck. Accordingly, the Court chooses to find a mid-point damage claim
between the two estimates in the sum of $2,750 and awards damages to Barber Brothers against
Mr. Foianini for the same.
30.

In the automobile industry, a dealership also has boarding costs for the vehicle or

expense- to-sale costs connected with each vehicle, including flooring costs. Based on its own
extensive financial records, John Barber testified that the average aggregate expense for all used
vehicles is $2,073, less variable expenses of such things as advertising and commissions, leaving
an average boarding cost of $1,587 per used vehicle, or $52.90 per day for a 30-day month.
31.

Under the facts of this case, Barber Brothers held the vehicle from October 25,

2005, until March 27, 2006, or 153 days. Multiplying the 153 days by $52.90, Barber Brothers
claims it is entitled to damages for boarding the vehicle of $8,093. The Court disagrees with the
amount of the claim because the claim makes no allowance for the expected time it would have
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normally taken Barber Brothers to sell the vehicle. Though the Court heard no testimony on this
issue, the Court believes that it is perusable in measuring damages in this ease to take an average
boarding cost for all other vehicles in this dealership, as u a reasonable approximation" of
damages. In doing so, the Court subtracts the average boarding cost of $1,587 from the $8,093
incurred in this ease. Accordingly, the Court awards boarding-cost damages to Barber Brothers
in the sum of $6,506. Under the circumstances of this case, especially in the face of Mr.
Foianini's stonewalling and intransigence for three months while Barber Brothers tried in good
faith to resolve its dispute with him amicably, Barber Brothers used reasonable efforts to dispose
of the vehicle and the amount claimed is reasonable. John Barber testified that had defendants
cooperated early, all damages could have been averted.
32.

Although John Barber was unable to say categorically that it had to floor Mr.

Foianini's vehicle, which is part of boarding costs, he sufficiently persuaded the Court that even
if it did not have to floor the Dodge vehicle because his cash flow was sufficient, the business,
nonetheless, lost money, probably more than what it is seeking. The dealership had $31,000 tied
up in the vehicle from October 25, 2005, until it sold the vehicle on March 27, 2006. With that
sum, Barber Brothers could have purchased three more vehicles and, upon selling them, realized
$3,000 profit on each of them.
33.

Paragraph 6 of the "Conditions and Warranties" under the contract provides that

seller may be awarded a reasonable attorney fee to enforce any of the terms, conditions, or
warranties under the contract. Because Barber Brothers seeks to enforce Mr. Foianini's breach of
his warranty that all pollution control equipment was on the vehicle, when he had, in fact,
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removed the catalytic converter, Barber Brothers is entitled to recover attorney fees for the
enforcement of this claim.
34.

Additionally, the Court finds and concludes, as a matter of law, that Barber

Brothers is entitled to attorney fees in bringing its fraud claim against Mr. Foianini, under
authority of Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56. Mr. Foianini's defense was asserted in bad faith and was
without merit because he has no legal basis for a defense. His actions were patently fraudulent,
This case involves no instance of Mr. Foianini uout selling" Barber Brothers or of pennissible
"puffery" in a commercial transaction, as Foianini asserts. Rather, with deliberate calculation,
Mr. Foianini concealed and misrepresented the condition of a damaged and altered vehicle no
longer covered by the manufacture's warranty on which he knew Barber Brothers was relying as
part and parcel of the transaction.
35.

Throug.li concealment and misrepresentation, Mr. Foianini sold to an unsuspecting

Barber Brothers dealership a year-old truck with a defective rebuilt engine that he knew would
appear to be under factory warranty. He also misrepresented under an express written warranty
that he had not removed or altered any of the vehicle's pollution control devices, when, in fact,
he had removed the catalytic converter, contrary to federal regulations. The evidence of Mr.
Foianini's intent to commit fraud in this case is overwhelmingly clear and convincing. In fact,
the Court has no reasonable doubt about his intent. Therefore, he cannot have an honest belief in
the propriety of contesting Barber Brothers' claim and he knows that his actions only hinder and
delay justice in this case. Under these circumstances, he plainly acted in bad faith by asserting a
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defense, thereby adding to the already significant financial burdens his egregious behavior had
caused Barber Brothers.
36.

Paragraph 12(a) of the contract warrants that the pollution control equipment

installed by the manufacturer, namely the catalytic converter, has not been removed from the
vehicle. By signing the contract, both Kelly Foianini and Bronson Foianini made an express
warranty under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-313. The evidence established that Bronson Foianini
had removed the catalytic converter. The court concludes that both defendants are liable for
breach of an express warranty pertaining to the catalytic converter. In this case, John Barber, on
recall by the defense, testified that a new catalytic converter would cost $350. The court
received no evidence of the cost of labor to install the catalytic converter. Therefore, the court
limits the judgment for breach of warranty in favor of Barber Brothers against Kelly Foianini and
Bronson Foianini in the amount of $350. This damage award is included in the previous damage
total against Bronson Foianini.
37.

Barber Brothers has incurred reasonable attorney's fees and costs in connection

with the prosecution of its claims herein in the sum of $
fees, and in the sum of $

as and for attorney's

, as and for taxable costs, in the total sum of

which should be apportioned as follows: $

to Mr. Foianini and $

to Kelly Foianini.
38.

As agreed between counsel, Barber Brothers may present an affidavit of fees and

costs to Mr. Bartlett, Mr. Foianini's counsel, prior to presenting them to the Court. Unless Mr.
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Foianini objects within ten days after service, the fees and costs arc approved, In the instance of
an objection, the Court will grant a hearing.
From the foregoing Findings Of Fact, the Court hereby makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Barber Brothers is entitled to three claims for damages against Mr. Foianini:

namely, (1) the lost profits on the Dodge Truck in the sum of $2,450 (less a credit of any money
Barber Brothers received over the $31,600 Barber Brothers paid Mr. Foianini for his truck); (2)
boarding costs in the sum of $6,506 for the five months that it was stuck carrying the truck in
inventory before it was sold; and (3) breach of contract damages against Kelly Foianini, and Mr.
Foianini, jointly and severally, for $350.
2.

Barber Brothers is entitled to be^aw^rded its attorneys fees and taxable costs

incurred herein the total amount of $ \Zrrx5ftPt'rt

as an

^ f° r ^s attorney's fees and %J-~* (If^

as and for its taxable costs for a total sum of $ \^v • W*D

^S^^^aj^ka^^^^c^^^

against Mr. Poianini > a1^^=====s= : = : ^= s: ap3SstKelly Foianini.^(/vt(.( \J0L3.

The Court declines to' award punitive damaged
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Michael D. Lyon
District Court Judge
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And
Conclusions Of Law, was served upon the following individual, by hand delivering a copy
thereof, at the address shown below on the c p ^ day of December, 2006.
Matthew Bartlett
BARTLETT & WEBSTER
5093 South 1500 West
Riverdale, UT 84405
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